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INTRODUCTION
Studies of misconception, superstition, pseudopsychological 
beliefs* and cognitive distortion, which levitt (195?) defines as a 
"misconceived belief or opinion”, have been aimed at determining only 
which misconceptions were held, to what' extent they were held, and 
what their sources were (Gustav, 1960; Valentine, 1936; Dudycha, 1938; 
etc.). Nixon (1925) investigating superstitious beliefs, and Patterson 
(1923)* investigating pseudopsychological beliefs in an effort to 
determine to what extent these beliefs were held by college students, 
found the mean per cent of students believing ; in each item to be 
30.1 and 38 per cent respectively. Longstaff (19^7) repeated Patterson’s 
study in 19^6 and found the mean per cent of belief in each item 
to be only 11 per cent. Levitt, using Nixon's questionaire, found 
the mean per cent of belief in each superstition to be 6.1 per cent. 
Levitt suggested that this does not mean that cognitive distortion 
or superstition no longer exist, but that "the nature of the un­
founded beliefs, however, has undergone alteration with the years."
This would seem to be borne out by a study done by Hergenhahn (19^1) 
in which he presented an inventory of current misconceptions and found 
the mean per cent of belief in each item to be 3^-2 per cent. A com­
parison of Hergenhahn's results with those of Levitt and Longstaff 
suggests, that while misconceptions are prevalent to roughly the same 
extent as they were in the mid-1920s, the content of todays misconcep­
tions is different from that of the mid~1920s. Thus it would appear 
that such results are consistent with Levitt's speculation that neither 
content nor time are relevant factors or determinants in the continued
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existence of misconception. Although this may be complicated by 
geographical factors (Levitt and Nixon* s studies were done at New 
York University, Patterson and Longstaff*s at the University of Minn­
esota, and Hergenhahn*s and the present study at Montana State Uni­
versity), a determination of their influence is beyond the scope of 
this study. It also may be noted that Hergenhahn*s results need 
verification. This will be attempted in the present study.
In an investigation to determine what factors are involved,
$kme ( 1 9 4 0 )  found home to be the major source of these beliefs; that 
emotional maladjustment had a low correlation with superstitious be­
liefs, and that intelligence had a negative correlation (r « - . 4 0 0  
to - . 4 7 0 )  with superstition. Zapf (1945) concluded that age, intel­
ligence, socioeconomic status and semesters of science, "while having 
a bearing on belief in superstition are none of them determining or 
influential factors." She proposed that suggestibility, as measured 
by the number of items never heard before and believed in, was one 
of the determining factors. Zapf's findings indicated that "Pupils 
who accept uncritically items which they have never heard before are 
those who accept and continue to believe items which they have heard 
before. Belief in superstition thus becomes a special case of uncrit­
ical aeepetance of verbal propositions," or, in a word, credulousness.
Suggestibility, or credulousness as defined by this quotation 
from Zapf, may be considered a result of the structural characteristics 
of the belief system of those individuals who accept and continue to 
hold misconceptions. This suggests that a relevant factor in the 
continued acceptance of misconception may be the structural character­
istics of the individual’s belief system and the personality traits
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from which these structural characteristics result,
A major attempt at describing the structure of belief systems 
was carried out by Rokeaeh (1960) in Hie Open and Closed Mind,
Kokeaeh suggested that the basic distinction between the open and 
closed mind is “the extent to which the person can receive, evaluate, 
and act on relevant information received from the outside on its own 
intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation 
from within the person or from the outside,9 The individual’s ability 
to do this, according to Rokeaeh, is a function of the structure of 
his belief system. The structure of the belief system of the individual 
with a closed mind is characterized by isolation of beliefs within the 
system, greater differentiation of the belief system than the disbelief 
system, and narrowness of the system. One interpretation of why this 
type of structure should result is provided by Frenkel-Brunswick 
(19^9) who suggested that, as a result of early parent-child relations, 
there emerges differential abilities to tolerate emotional ambivalence 
toward parents which spills over into the social and cognitive 
spheres as well. Frenkel-Brunswick indicates that this results in 
such tendencies as “jumping to generalizations on the basis of cer­
tain specific and external aspects,9 to “arrive at premature closure as 
to valuative aspects, often at the neglect of reality0 and the “carrying 
oVer of old sets” (19^9)» Rokeaeh further suggested that if a closed 
person is threatened or anxious he will become “highly attuned to 
irrelevant, internal and external pressures, and accordingly, be 
unable to evaluate information independent of source.” He stated 
that the closed person over-relies on authority and that power of 
the authority is not dependent on cognitive correctness. Given a
k
"package" of information the closed person is forced to accept all 
or reject all.
Thus it seems possible that credulousness is a result of this 
type of structure; that premature closure, isolation of beliefs within 
the system, jumping to 'generalizations, over-reliance on authority, 
attention to irrelevant internal and external aspects when threatened 
or anxious, and the carrying over of old sets, are the prerequisites 
for a consistent belief in and the acceptance of misconceptions. If 
correct, this would suggest that measures developed to meisure dogmatism 
would also tend to serve as a measure of credulousness.
It was the purpose of this study to investigate these possi­
bilities; that is, to determine whether or not belief in pseudopsycho­
logical statements is still evident and consistent with the degree 
of misconception found in earlier studies and whether credulousness, 
as measured by the number of items not heard before and falsely 
believed, is a factor in the continued belief in misconception. But 
the primary purpose of this study was to determine whether closed 
mindedness, and the underlying personality and cognitive features 
suggested by Rokeaeh and Frenkel-Brunswick, are determining or influ­
ential factors in the acceptance of and continued belief in misconception.
The specific hypotheses were:
1. The extent to which pseudopsychological beliefs are 
held will be consistent with previous findings by Nixon, 
Patterson, and Hergenhahn.
2. The extent to which a person continues to believe 
pseudopsychological statements will be a function of how 
many pseudopsychological statements the individual accepts 
that, he has not heard before.
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3. Scores obtained on an inventory of pseudopsychological 
beliefs will be highly correlated with Rokeaeh*s dogmatism 
scale which measures closed aindedness.
There will be a negative relationship between the number 
of misconceptions held and critical thinking ability.
5. People who hold a large number of misconceptions will 
be more anxious thah those who don’t.
6.. People who hold a large number of misconceptions will 
exhibit a greater wish for reliance on authority than those 
who don’t.
METHOD
Subjects. The study was done in two phases. Ss in Phase 1 were 
167 males and 89 females, who ranged in age from 1? to 49 (M = 19.6), 
enrolled in six introductory psychology sections at Montana State 
University. Ss in Phase 2 were selected from those Ss participating 
in Phase 1 on the basis of their scores on an inventory of ps'eudopsycho- 
logieal beliefs; 83 Ss (56 males and 27 females) from a sample of 100 
were willing to participate in Phase 2.
Test Materials. The test materials employed in Phase 1 were the 
Dogmatism Scale Form E, described by Rokeaeh (i960), which measures 
the extent to which a person is open or closed minded and an inventory 
of pseudopsychological beliefs (IPB)(see Appendix A), The IPB is com­
prised of 84 items selected from introductory psychology texts and 
workbooks, (Munn, 1961; Ruch, 1958) and prior studies of pseudopsycho­
logical beliefs, (Gustav, I96O; Valentine, 1936). It was initially 
given to 49 students who ranged in age from 17 to 29 (M = 20,2) in 
an intermediate algebra class at Montana State University to determine
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the currency and prevalence of the beliefs. Because all but one item 
was falsely believed or disbelieved by one or more Ss, it was decided 
to retain the entire 84 items. The response options during this pre­
testing were true and false,but for this study were changed to “Heard 
before and believe it is true;; Heard, before and believe it is false;
Hot heard before and believe it is true; and Hot heard before and be­
lieve it is false,” when given to the psychology sections. The instruc­
tions for the IPB were;
Some, of the. following statements are true and some are 
false. Tbu will have heard some of the statements previously 
and some ^ou will not have heard. When marking an answer, you 
are to indicate in the following manner whether you feel an 
item is true or false and whether or not you have previously 
heard the statement. Fill in the space on your answer sheet 
under;
A- If you Have Heard the item before and believe it 
is true.
B- If you Have Heard the item before and believe it 
is false.
C- If you Have Hot Heard the item before and believe it 
is true.
D- If you Have Hot Heard the' item before and believe it. 
is false.
Be sure that all your answer marks are black and that 
they completely fill the answer boxes. Do not make any 
stray marks on your answer sheet. If you erase, do so com­
pletely. Do not omit any items.
A score on the IPB consisted of the number of items falsely believed 
disregarding whether or not the item had been heard before. Thus a 
.high, scoring individual would be one who held a large number of pseu­
dopsychological beliefs.
An odd-even reliability corrected by the Spearman Brown- formula 
was obtained for the IPB (r-tt = *775) from the data obtained in the 
initial testing of the six sections of introductory psychology. It was
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felt that this was sufficient reliability for the purpose of making the 
group comparisons to be used in this study.
No plans were made to determine the validity of the IPB as a 
measure of credulousness. Rather it was proposed at that time only to 
investigate some correlates of this pattern of responding to verbal 
stimuli.
The test materials used in Phase 2 were the 31 items from the 
Minnesota Multiphasie Personality Inventory (MMPI) used by Welch (1953) 
as a measure of anxiety; the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal.'
Form Am (Watson & Glaser, 1952): and the Deference Scale of the Edwards 
Personal Preference Schedule (EEPS) (Edwards, 1959)*
Procedure. The study was conducted in two parts (Phase 1 and 
Phase 2); the primary purpose of the first part being to select Ss for 
the second part.
Phase 1. Testing in Phase 1 was on the first day of class of 
Spring Quarter, 19^3• It involved the administration of the IPB and 
Dogmatism Scale to six sections of introductory psychology. Ss 
were told only that the tests were part of a research project aimed 
at determining what beliefs and opinions were common among college 
students. Ss were divided into two groups on the basis of their scores 
on the IPB. Group L consisted of those Ss whose scores were among the 
lowest 50 in the distribution of scores obtained by all Ss in Phase 1.
Group H consisted of those Ss whose scores were among the highest 50.
Phase 2. All Ss were administered the Deference Scale of the EPPS, 
the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal, and the anxiety items 
from the MMPI, in that order. They were told only that the tests were 
another part of the research on the beliefs and opinions of college students.
RESULTS
Hypothesis 1. The per cent of Ss indicating incorrect belief or 
disbelief in each item was determined. The values were averaged to 
obtain a mean per cent of belief (M = 37*9)• These data are presented 
in Table 1 along with the values obtained by Hixon, Patterson, and
Insert Table 1 here
Hergenhahn. It may be noted that the values are relatively consistent, 
all falling between 30 and kO per cent. The data available from these 
earlier studies were not sufficient to permit tests of statistical 
significance.
Hypothesis 2. To determine to what extent continued belief in 
misconceptions heard previously is a function of belief in items not 
heard previously, the IPB was scored separately for items heard before 
and items not heard before. These two sets of scores were correlated
using the Pearson r (r = -.^57)*
Hypothesis 3. Total scores obtained on the IPB and scores ob­
tained on the Dogmatism Scale were correlated for all Ss in Phase 1
using the Pearson r in order to determine the relationship between
dogmatism and the acceptance of and the belief in pseudopsychological 
statements (r = .370, p <.01). The significance of the correlation was 
determined with the Wallace-Snedecor Table (Guilford, 1956). A com­
parison of the, S. D, of scores obtained in the present study on the 
Dogmatism Scale and those reported by Rpkeaeh (S. Ds. vary from 22.1
Insert Table 2 here
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to 28.2) on college students indicates that Rokeaeh1s are nearly twice 
as large as the S. D. reported here. This suggested that the range 
of scores obtained in the present study was sufficiently restricted 
to warrant the use of Pearson’s correction for curtailment (Thorncjike, 
1949). The corrected r was .584.
Hypothesis 4. A one-tailed t test was used to evaluate the dif­
ference between Group L and Group H on the Watson-Glaser Critical 
Thinking Appraisal (t = 4.013» df = 40, p =^.0005). The one-tailed 
test was used because a significant difference would support our hypoth­
esis only if Group L did significantly better on the Critical Thinking 
Appraisal than Group H. Negative results of any magnitude would have 
led to rejection of our hypothesis. It was felt that no correction for 
intelligence need be made.in view of the rather surprising finding that 
there was no relationship between scores on the IPB and the ACT , a 
college entrance test for which scores were available in the University 
records for all Ss (Pearson r = .008).
Hypothesis 5. A one-tailed t test was used to evaluate the dif­
ference between Group H and Qroup L on the anxiety items (t = .048, 
df = 40). The t value indicates that there was no significant difference 
between the two groups.
Hypothesis 6. A, one-tailed t test between Group H and Group L op 
Deference Seale showed no significant differences (t = ,713. 
df = 40). However, it may be noted in Table 2 that this difference as 
well as that for the anxiety JLtems is in the expected direction.
No significant difference was found between sexes on the IPB 
(t = *870, df = 254). This suggests that there is no relationship 
between sex and the number of pseudopsychological beliefs held.
DISCUSSION
The results of this study Supported our hypothesis that the 
extent to which pseudopsychological beliefs are held would be consis­
tent with the findings of Nixon, Patterson, and Hergenhahn. This 
relative consistency in the mean per cent of belief suggests that mis­
conception is still prevalent to the same extent it was in the mid- 
1920s. These results, when compared with those of Levitt and Longstaff 
(6.1 and 11 per cent), who used the same items as Nixon and Patterson, 
support Levitt's speculation that cognitive distortion still exists 
and that only its nature, i. e., the content has changed. Thus it 
would appear that neither content nor time are relevant factors or 
determinants in the continued existence of misconception.
The negative correlation found between items not heard before and 
falsely believed or disbelieved and items heard before and falsely 
believed or disbelieved, is the converse of Zapf's findings and contrary 
to ouj* hypothesis. These results need further verification because 
of their diametrical opposition to those of Zapf's. Similar results 
could only have been obtained if we had correlated the items not 
heard before with the total score. The results obtained do suggest, 
however, that It is not the uncritical acceptance of any verbal pro­
position which is a determinant of the continued belief in misconception, 
but more specifically the maintenance of verbal propositions previously 
heard and accepted. It is as if having heard the proposition before 
in itself lends validity to the proposition. The maintenance of 
belief in misconception implies isolation of beliefs within the system
and greater differentiation of the belief system than the disbelief
10
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system, which are characteristics of the closed mind. The correlation 
also suggests that Ss who uncritically accept misconceptions do not 
maintain them* This might be interpreted as open mindedness or a 
willingness to accept the propostition until evidence can be found 
for or against it.
The correlation between the IPB and the Dogmatism Scale was not 
as high as expected, but does indicate a substantial relationship 
between dogmatism and the belief in misconception. This indicates that 
the structure of the belief system, as defined by Rokeaeh, is an important 
factor in the belief in misconception. Although its:relative weight 
is hard to assess because of the limited scope of thp IPB, and because 
whatever other variables may be involved are at present unknown, these 
results suggest that the variables involved in dogmatism are those which 
are determining or influential in the continued adherence to misconception.
The significant difference found between Group L and Group H on 
the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal supports our hypothesis 
the there would be a relationship between critical thinking ability 
and the number of misconceptions held. The Watson-Glaser, which derives 
only a total score, measures S‘s ability to discriminate between degrees 
of truth or falsity or probability of certain inferences drawn from 
given facts or data; his ability to recognize unstated assumptions; 
to recognize the relation of implication between propositions; to 
weigh evidence and to distinguish between unwarranted generalizations and 
probable inferences; to distinguish between arguments which are strong 
and important to the question at issue, and those which are weak and 
unfcportant or irrelevant. These are largely the same cognitive fea­
tures suggested by Frenkel-Brunswick and Rokeaeh whieh result in open 
or closed mindedness. The fach that a significant difference was found
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between Group H and Group L on a measure of these cognitive features 
would seem to support the existence of a relationship between closed 
mindedness and the number of misconceptions held.
A significant difference was not found between Group H an4 L for 
the anxiety test or the Deference Scale. These findings, coupled with 
the significant difference found between the two groups on the Watson- 
Glaser, suggest that it is not these particular personality traits 
of the closed-minded person which distinguish between people who hold 
a large number of pseudopsychological beliefs, but rather the cognitive 
traits.
In view of these findings it would seem that further investi­
gation of the relationship between misconception and the structural 
characteristics of the belief system is warranted. Future studies 
should include measures of misconception which are wider in scope and 
take in other areas of raisconception and other measures of the under­
lying personality and cognitive features suggested by Frenkel-Brunswick 
and Rokeaeh as those which result in open and closed mindedness,
SUMMARY.
The purpose of this study was to determine whether or not pseudo­
psychological beliefs are still evident and consistent with previous 
findings; whether or not credulousness, as defined by the number of 
items not heard before and falsely believed, was a determining factor, 
and the relationship between pseudopsychological beliefs and dogmatism 
and its underlying cognitive and personality features. Six Montana 
State University introductory psychology sections were given the. Inven­
tory of Psbudopsychologieal Beliefs (IPB) and the Dogmatism Scale.
From this group, 50 of the highest and 50 of the lowest scorers were
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selected to participate in Phase 2. Of these, 83 returned and were 
given the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal, the Deference 
Scale of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule and 31 items 
measureing anxiety from the MMPI. The mean per cent of belief in 
pseudopsychological items was consistent with previous findings. A 
substantial relationship was found between the Dogmatism Scale 
and the IPB. Of the three scales given in Phase 2, a significant 
difference was found between the two.groups only on the test of critical 
thinking. It was felt that these results supported the hypothesis 
that determining or influential factors in the continued mainte­
nance of misconception were a result of the structure of the belief 
system.
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Table 2
Distribution Values For All Seales
Scales Mean S.D.
IPB
Males 31.41 6.19
Females 32.70 5.56
Total 31.87 6.80
Dogmatism 156.05 12.g4
Critical Thinking
Group H 63.52 8.26
Group L 71.39 9.34
Deference
Group H 9.57 3.84
Group L 8.89 3.66
Anxiety
Group H 6.69 3.76
Group 1 6.73 4.03
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1. It is unnecessary for a mother bird to teach her young to fly. 
They fly without instruction.
2. Modern civilization is almost wholly a product of the white race,
3. Fast workers in school or in industry make more mistakes than 
slow workers.
4. Human nature is not entirely determined'by heredity.
5 . - A- blond and a brunette are more likely to have a happy married
life than two persons of like complexions.
6. Unfavorable attitudes toward people will be removed if personal 
contact can be arranged.
?. A person who is easily hypnotized is likely to be weak minded. 
Spirits do not cling to old houses, causing them to be haunted.
9. Slightly retarded children eventually reach the same level of 
mental brightness as the slightly precocious. They just mature 
somewhat slowly.
10. Savages do not. have keener senses than civilized people.
11. The nepve fibers in a nervous person are not so strong as those 
in a healthy person.
12. Scientists have shown that the porpoise rather than the chimp 
most nearly approaches man in intelligence.
1 3. People do not do unusual things in a crowd because a group mind 
takes over control of their actions.
14. A child comes into the world with a knowledge of good and evil 
which is his inborn conscience.
15. Dogs make good pets because over a period of years domesticity has 
been bred into them.
16. Men and boys are more often color blind than women or girls.
17. Most great men are not born of poor but honest parents.
18. It has been shown that criminals are of a characteristic physical 
type.
19. Man came from monkey, according to Darwin.
20. Groups affect a person primarily through his emotions.
21. A slow learner does not remember what he has learned better than 
a fast learner.
19
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22. Any physical or mental disease can be contracted by thinking 
hard about it.
23. The people of each race have a unique mentality.
24. Dogs recognize the presence of death and give voice to their 
grief by howling.
25. It has been shown that last-born children in large families are 
less intelligent bn the average than first-born children in the 
same family.
26. All men are not created equal in capacity for achievement.
27. Dreams are almost never of prophetic significance, foretelling
future events.
28. Psychology cap determine the specific job a man is best suited for.
29. A group typically selects as its leader the more vigorous and
tallest member.
30. Fear of bugs and snakes is not instinctive in most people.
31. A feeble-minded person is one who has had no opportunity to learn.
32. Red-headed people are by nature no more tempermental than any other 
people *
33. It is easier for a person of German ancestry to learn German in
college even if he has never heard it spoken at home.
34. Beavers and squirrels do not know whether an approaching winter 
is to be mild or severe and don’t prepare themselves accordingly.
35* Chess playing will develop your powers of concentration.
36. There are more men than women in hospitals for the mentally deranged,
37. The majority of criminals are very low in intelligence.
38. Adults do not sometimes become feebleminded from overstudy.
39* Superior as well as inferior children are possible as a result of 
Crosses between races, such as Japanese and Americans.
40. A person who is shifty eyed is likely to be dishonest.
41# Long, slender hands do not usually indicate an artistic nature.
42. Many people have an inborn urge to jump off high places..
43. The study of mathematics is not valuable because it gives us a 
logical mind.
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44. The color red is not especially exciting to cattle.
45. Children always learn faster and better than adults.
46. Prejudiced people generally are more independent than unpred- 
judiced people.
47. Man has more than five senses.
48. If you will stare at a persons back:, you can make him turn around.
49. No animal is as intelligent as the average man.
50. In general, primitive and oriental peoples do not have many
mental disorders.
51. Children born to parents who are closely related, say uncle and 
niece, are almost sure to have inferior intelligence.
52. A boy does not recieve more of his personality from his father 
than from his mother.
53* With minor exceptions, the ability to get along with, and control 
people cannot be learned.
54. Women do not have a power of intuition that men do not have.
55. Under emotional stress man frequently displays extraordinary 
strength and endurance.
56. Very intelligent children are likely to be weak physically.
57. The only taboo that all societies subscribe to is that against 
mother-son incest.
58. Winters are less severe now than they were 40 or 50 years ago.
59* Great beauty and high intellectual ability seldom go together.
60. People of very superior intelligence, as a group, do not have 
higher insanity and suicide rates than the general population.
61. A glow reader understands and retains what he has learned less 
well than a fast reader.
62. An expectant mother is able to influence the character of her child
by her thoughts during pregnancy.
63. Man is not instinctively aggressive.
64. Environment is equally as important as heredity in determining an 
individuals level of intelligence.
65. Whenever a person learns he improves.
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66. Marriages in which there is an age difference of several years 
between husband and wife are more likely to fail than marriages 
between people whose ages are close together.
67. The tendency for certain types of mental disorders to run in 
families is not clear evidence that insanity is cause by bad heredity.
68. . People tend to remember unpleasant experiences for a longer period
of time than pleasant experiences.
69. If a man is completely deprived of both food and water for a period 
of days, his sensations of hunger will become more intense than 
those of thirst.
70. In learning a new and unfamiliar task, the individual usually makes 
greater gains in performance ..during early practice periods than 
during later ones.
71. Color blindness cannot usually be cured by exercises and diet.
72. Truth serum is often used in criminal investigation because suspects 
are unable to lie when under its influence,
73* Young babies have an instinctive fear of the dark.
74, Fears cannot be inherited from ones parents.
75* Cats cannot see in complete darkness.
76. Competition among people is an instinctive characteristic of 
human nature..
77* Once a person becomes mentally ill, he will never again be really 
normal.
78. The faster one learns the faster he forgets.
79* A blind person has a keener sense of touch and hearing because 
the strength normally in the eyes has gone to the other sense 
organs and made them more sensitive.
80. No reliable estimate of a person*s character can be formed from a 
study of his facial characteristics.
81. No defect of mind or body can hold us back if we have enough willpower.
82. At birth not all children are of equal mentality.
83. Mental instability in parents tends to cause a similar condition 
in their offsprings.
8A. It has been shown that excessive tickeling of a child will make 
him a stammerer.
